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Team Telecom – Officially known as Committee on the Evaluation of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (Committee) — is an inter-American committee tasked with reviewing certain foreign investments in order to reduce the risk to foreign investments. Team Telecom frequently reviews telecommunications license applications filed before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) by foreign-owned companies seeking to operate in the United States or to connect to foreign telecommunications networks.
Team Telecom is aware of cyber security risks; Focused on threats and vulnerabilities. Department of Defense It includes the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice. The Attorney General is the Chairman of Team Telecom. Minister of Foreign Affairs treasurer Secretary of Commerce; Director of the Office of Management and Budget; US Trade Representative Director of National Intelligence; General Services Manager; National Security Adviser; Deputy Director of the President for Economic Policy; Chairman of the Economic Advisory Council of the Office of Science and Technology; Acts as an advisor to Team Telecom.
Under federal law, The FCC is authorized to prohibit the construction of new or expansion of existing telecommunications networks except as “required” by “public convenience and necessity.”1 FCC national security; foreign policy; Factors such as trade policy etc. need to be considered. Another legal provision gives the FCC the power to “suspend or revoke” international submarine cable licenses for maintenance. would advance the rights and interests of the United States … or the security of the United States.”2 Team Telecom to approve the license application in question; It often recommends rejecting or conditioning its approval on a mitigation measure. Typically, The FCC refers applicants for international telecommunications service or submarine landing licenses to Team Telecom if they have 10 percent or more foreign investment. In addition, Applicants who exceed the FCC’s various foreign ownership measures are referred to Team Telecom.
ARCOS-1 USA Inc. to the FCC on November 30, 2022 by Team Telecom. and A.SurNet Inc. He rejected the application of the submarine cable system and suggested adding a new section directly connected to the United States via the Cuba landing site. . It will be a direct commercial submarine cable connection between the United States and Cuba. In Team Telecom’s view, This application raises national security concerns because the cable landing system in Cuba is owned and controlled by Cuba’s state telecommunications monopoly, Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba SA (ETECSA). The committee fears that the Cuban state “has access to sensitive U.S. data that passes through the new section of cable through ETECSA’s control.”
According to Team Telecom, Cuba has long represented a significant counterintelligence threat to the United States due to its espionage and other intelligence activities targeting the United States. Therefore, “[d]Exclusive use of cable by a Cuban state-owned company; A remote system to control the cable’s Cuban terminal and navigate it would further the Cuban government’s intelligence objectives. By providing direct access to communications and vital information of the American people over cable.”
Additionally, “routes intended for destinations outside of Cuba may not pass through Cuban networks, but may nevertheless be diverted by ETECSA or rerouted through this cable into Cuban territory and into the hands of the Cuban government.” Finally, Finally, Cuba’s friends and allies, China and Russia, did not trust Team Telecom. In Team Telecom’s words, Cuba “could share any information gathered by this cable with foreign adversaries, thereby enhancing additional counterintelligence efforts by foreign adversaries against the United States.”
Other Team Telecom efforts have also raised suspicions about China. And it shows no signs of abating. for example, Following Team Telecom’s recommendation last March, the FCC revoked the domestic authority of ComNet and its parent company, Pacific Networks, and ended the international authority to provide telecommunications services.3 The FCC said these entities “are subject to exploitation, influence and control by the Chinese government and are likely to be forced to comply with the Chinese government’s demands without adequate due process under independent judicial oversight.”4 According to the FCC, there has been a significant increase in Chinese activity related to network breaches. That being the case, the FCC found that continuing to authorize ComNet and Pacific Networks posed “significant national security and law enforcement risks . . . .”5
Similarly, in February 2022, the FCC followed Team Telecom’s recommendation to revoke China Unicom’s domestic and international authority to provide telecommunications services in the United States. The FCC is concerned that China Unicom is owned and controlled by the Chinese government. The FCC gave China Unicom a chance to explain its side of the story in April 2020. Ultimately, The FCC said that China Telecom (Americas) Corporation (China Telecom) and China Mobile International (USA) Inc. have “shared national security and law enforcement concerns.” (China Mobile) concluded that the federal government was affected. Similarly, The FCC has revoked and denied the organizations’ carrier authority, respectively — apply here.
Specifically, with respect to China Telecom, Team Telecom recommends that the FCC revoke and terminate that company’s authority under its Section 214 International Section 214 Authorization.6 Despite the 2007 mitigation agreement between Team Telecom and China Telecom, The committee identified the company as a difficult partner in mitigation efforts.7 Furthermore, the FCC seconded this view because it raised national security and law enforcement risks by providing opportunities for Chinese government ownership and control of China Telecom. [China
Telecom] and Chinese government-sponsored actors accessing U.S. communications; to save to harass and/or abuse; It allows them to engage in espionage and other dangerous activities against the United States.”8 Finally, Regarding China Mobile, the FCC followed Team Telecom’s recommendation in denying the company’s application to provide international services, citing the FCC’s determination that China Mobile is “likely to be affected. [China’s] exploitation influence Control and so on. [it] The Chinese government is likely to comply with espionage and intelligence requests.”9
1. 47 USC § 214(a); FCC v. See also RCA Communications, Inc.., 346 US 86, 90 (1953); Therefore, the policy and regulations on rates for competitive common services and services authorizations, CC Docket No. 79-252; First Report and Order; 85 FCC 2d 1; 40-44, ¶¶ 117—29 (1980); Streamlining international Section 214 approval process and tax compliance requirements., IB Docket No. 95-118; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; 10 FCC Rcd 13477; 13480, ¶ 6 (1995).
2. 47 USC § 35.
Pacific Networks Corp. and See In the Matter of ComNet (USA) LLC.
2022 FCC LEXIS 1010 at 13 (March 23, 2022).
4. Idea. At 2
6. In the case of China Telecom (Americas) Corporation35 FCC Rcd 15006; Day 9 (December 14, 2020).
7. See ID. 53.
8. Idea. At 27
9. China Mobile Int’l (USA) Inc. 34 FCC Rcd 3361 at 8.
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